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SOURCES OF LAW, LEGAL CHANGE AND AMBIGUITY. By Alan Wat-
son.t University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 
1984. Pp. 157. $22.50. Review by Walter A. Rafalko.i 
This book has been written by one of America's most prolific au-
thors on legal history. It presents an overview of the law-making process 
from historical, comparative, and jurisprudential points of view and 
culminates in a provocative plan for refonning our law-making system. 
This reviewer has been long under the impression that law schools 
should focus early on jurisprudence, common law history, and compara-
tive law in the curriculum of the law school and not wait until the last 
year or graduate law school to offer these three courses as electives. Juris-
prudence deals with the important questions of when a legal system be-
gins and ends; how it functions; how society deals with rights, duties, 
obligations, privileges, and immunities; and what should be included and 
excluded from the legal system. Since our system of jurisprudence is 
based on the Anglo-American common law tradition, a study of the de-
velopment of the common law helps us to understand the function and 
bases of our own judicial system. Ours is not the only legal system, and 
we may obtain a different perspective by studying the features of the civil 
law country systems through a course in comparative law. The three 
dimensions of jurisprudence, common law, and comparative law offer 
vantage points for understanding and improving our current legal sys-
tem. This book takes this three-dimensional approach. 
After an introduction, the book is divided into six chapters. The 
Introduction points out that the tenn "sources of law" is notoriously 
ambiguous and contradictory. In Western societies, legal sources in-
cluded custom, legislation, juristic opinion, and judicial precedent. In 
relying on these four bases of legal legitimacy, societies have, according 
to the author, produced laws unresponsive to social, economic, and polit-
ical factors. 1 
The author uses the tenn "sources of law" interchangeably with 
"methods of law-making." The starting point for his inquiry into sources 
of law is Roman law and Roman jurists. Chapter One is entitled 
"Sources of Law in Ancient Rome." In early Rome, judicial actions and 
the science of interpreting the laws were in the hands of the College of 
Pontiffs, presided over by a patrician,2 the ponti/ex maximus in 450 B.C. 
t Professor of Law and Classical Studies, University of Pennsylvania. 
t B.C.S., St. Louis University; LL.B., Boston University; LL.M., Georgetown Univer-
sity; LL.M., New York University; Dr. Jur., John Marshall University. Mr. Ra-
falko is a Professor of Law and Associate Dean, University of Baltimore. 
1. Some areas where the law was unresponsive, according to the author, included sov-
ereign immunity, spousal immunity, consumer fraud, women's rights to contract, 
juveniles' rights to fair hearings, and attorneys' rights to advertise. Change came 
eventually but much too slowly. 
2. The people of Rome at the time of the kingdom (753-509 B.C.) consisted of: (a) 
patricians - the nobility, who were eligible to occupy the country's highest offices; 
(b) plebians - the poorer non-privileged citizens; (c) clients - those attached to a 
patrician house; and, (d) slaves - captives brought to Rome by its Army. 
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It was not until the lex Ogulnia of 300 B.C., that plebians could enter the 
College of Pontiffs, thus ending the dominant position of the College of 
Pontiffs, whose exclusive membership consisted of the nobility. 
During the Empire, juristic opinion began to flourish because of ius 
respondendi 3 and the Law of Citations (426 A.D.). It was during the 
Principate of Augustus (27 B.C. - 14 A.D.) that the ius respondendi was 
instituted, giving leaders of the state the right to deliver opinions publicly 
under the authority and seal of the Principate. Under the Valentinian 
Law of Citations of 426 A.D., the great writings of Papinian, Paul, Ga-
ius, Ulpian, Modestinu8, and others were allowed to be cited as juristic 
authority for early Roman law. 
Statutes were an important source of law throughout the Republic 
(509 - 27 B.C.) and the reign of Augustus (27 B.C. - 14 A.D.), but they 
diminished in importance thereafter. The two most important statutes 
were the XII Tables of 451 B.C., which formed the foundation of Roman 
Law, and the lex Aquilia of 287 B.C., which gave rise to actions for inju-
ries done to property and persons under the statute. 
With the arrival of the Empire (27 B.c. - 565 A.D.), the constitu-
!iones of the emperor were what he determined by decreta,4 edicta,5 man-
data,6 and rescripta7 (epistulae 8 and subscriptiones 9), and all had the 
effect of imperial legislation. Orationes lO were speeches introduced into 
the Senate in the Emperor's name; they also acquired the force of law. 
Thus, imperial constitutions allowed the emperor to issue general laws. 
Judges were to follow what the public statutes prescribed, as interpreted 
by the juristic commentators. However, it was difficult for people to 
know what the law was. The lack of publicity of the constitutiones was 
solved, to some extent, by the publication of two unofficial collections of 
rescripts: the Codex Gregorianus (291 A.D.) and the Codex Hermogeni-
anus (295 A.D.). The general laws (leges generales) were published in 
the Codex Theodosianus (438 A.D.) and in Justinian's Codex (529 & 534 
A.D.), which included subscriptiones as well as general laws. Two other 
sources of Roman law were the senatus consulta 11 and custom. 12 Custom 
3. Translated as "the right of replying to questions of law." 
4. Decreta were judicial decisions given by the emperor when he acted as a judge. 
5. Edicta were proclamations issued by senior magistrates and the emperor. 
6. Mandata were commands or instructions to subordinate officials. 
7. Rescripta were written answers by the emperor on points of law to those who con-
sulted with him. 
8. Epistulae were the answers to questions submitted by inferior magistrates. 
9. Subscriptiones were answers to questions submitted by private citizens. 
10. Speeches made in the earlier period of the Empire (27 B.C. - 565 A.D.). 
11. Senatus consulta were decrees of the Senate. By the end of the third century. the 
Senate had become Rome's policy-making executive, and the senatus consultum had 
the force of law during the period of the Republic (509 B.C. - 27 B.C.). 
12. Custom is law established by long usage and represents acceptance by the authori-
ties of what the people do as having the force of law. It is law accepted by consent 
of our ancestors. 
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was not, however, of such importance in Roman Law as it was in the 
later French legal tradition. 
Chapter Two, entitled "Europe Before the Reception: The Example 
of Germany and Northern France," traces the sources of law as they 
existed historically from the thirteenth through the fifteenth centuries in 
Germany and northern France, before the reception of Roman law into 
Europe. It shows how official and unofficial customary laws ultimately 
merged, to greater or lesser extent, with Roman law. Justinian's Corpus 
Juris Civilis was promulgated in 534 A.D., but disappeared from Europe 
until the end of the tenth century. In Europe, this body of Roman law 
was slow to be received and accepted. In Germany, its influence was not 
felt until the fifteenth century. In northern France, because of the ex-
isting customary law (pays de droit coutumier), the Reception occurred 
slowly, though in the south, which already had a body of written law, 13 
Roman law was much earlier accepted as customary law. 
In Germany, the transplanting of law in this period was reflected in 
the Sachsenspiegel,14 a law book that gave, in two parts, IS an unofficial 
account of customary law. The weakness of the Sachsenspiegel was that 
it gave the law of only one region, Saxony. To compensate, two addi-
tional unofficial works were published, the Deutschenspiegel and the 
Schwabenspiegel. Although the goal of these books was to state a com-
mon German law for the entire country, the books succeeded mainly in 
perpetuating Saxon law only. 
There were two other major sources of German law. A town might 
adopt or accept the laws of another town's customary law, and this adop-
tion or acceptance was known as Schoffen. The Schoffen became a body 
of law finders. If a finding or judgment of theirs was not attacked at one 
of three annual meetings of all the inhabitants, it was treated as ap-
proved. The Schoffen also gave responses (Oberhofe) to legal questions 
posed by outside cities. The Weistumer16 was another systematic attempt 
to establish customary law. It did so through a formal declaration of 
what the law should be. This declaration was made by the community, 
summoned especially for this purpose, or by a community representative 
in reply to a legal question. Its end product could be regarded as a code 
of all the legal rules for an individual village. 
In Germany, customary law disappeared with the advent of the Re-
ception. In France, however, customary law flourished in spite of its dis-
advantages. At first, individuals prepared unofficial compilations for this 
locality. Often entitled Coutumes or Coutumiers, they were a collection 
of customs, unwritten laws, and forms of procedure. Two unofficial 
works of special importance in this juridical period were the Tres Ancien 
13. Pays de droit eerit, translated as "territories of written law." 
14. Translated as "Saxon Mirror." 
15. The Landreeht, or "territorial law," including private law, criminal law, and consti-
tutionallaw, and the Lehnreeht, translated as "feudal law." 
16. Translated as "superior court precedent'." 
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Coutumier de Normandie (1218-1223) and the Grand Coutumier de Nor-
mandie or Grand Coutumier (1254-1258). Until custom was officially 
written down, it could be developed in three ways: by contract, by court 
decisions, and by the writings of jurists. 
Chapter Three, "Reception and Partial Reception: Italy, France 
and Scotland," focuses on seventeenth century Italy. Justinian's Corpus 
Juris Civilis and its interpretations were readily accepted and expounded 
upon by Imerius and the Bologna law school in Italy. The main sources 
of Italian law after the Reception were Roman texts, juristic writings, 
judicial precedent, statute and custom. The author quotes extensively 
from Giovanni Battista De Luca's II Dottor Voigare (1673), showing 
that, apart from statute or local custom and a line of decisions from the 
local supreme court, there was no established ranking of legal sources. 
During the seventeenth century, Italy developed the ius commune,17 di-
vided into three categories: the five traditional civil law volumes, the 
sources of canon law, and the interpretations of legal writers. In Ger-
many and the Netherlands, the situation was the same as in Italy, and 
Roman law was accepted by the courts. 
In France, after the fifteenth century, the redaction of the coutumes 
created a fortress against Roman law in the "pays de droit coutumier," 
until the French code civil. The problem in France was to find the law 
when local custom failed. The author describes the three methods that 
Guy Coquille proposed in his commentary on the Coutume de Nivernais. 
The first method was to have recourse to Roman law. The second 
method was to use the custom of other districts. The third method was 
to use the reformed Coutume de Paris of 1580. 
In Scotland, there was only a partial reception of Roman law. Scot-
tish law was developed by Lord Stair in his Institutions of the Law of 
Scotland (1681). Lord Stair divided the sources of law into two groups: 
those that applied to society generally and those that applied to a particu-
lar society. Lord Stair enumerated for Scotland custom and statute. 
Custom was derived mainly from equity and from Roman, canonical, 
and feudal law when a custom was not formed. Statutory law, he stated, 
was created by the Acts of Parliament but was inferior to the ancient law 
because the statute was more likely to fall into desuetude. Judicial deci-
sions, however, could form a custom and then become binding in future 
cases. Development of the law was much in the hands of the judges to 
determine the existence of custom. 
Chapter Four, "English Law in the Modern Age," covers the period 
in England, from the mid-eighteenth century to the present, known as 
"The Age of Statute Law." The subject matter of this chapter is statu-
tory, judicial decisional, and customary law. Customary law, in the 
sense of local custom, was a minor source of law. For custom to be ac-
cepted as law, it had to be so old that "the memory of man runneth not 
17. Translated as "common law." 
618 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 14 
to the contrary" - i.e., back to the reign of Richard I (1189). The ad-
vantages and defects of statutory law are clearly set forth. IS In spite of 
law making by legislation in this period, England is best known for law 
making by its judicial courts. 19 In fact, the doctrine of stare decisis20 was 
firmly entrenched. In 1966, however, the House of Lords stated that in 
the future it would no longer be bound to follow its own decisions.21 The 
author lists three advantages for developing law by this kind of judicial 
decision-making. The first advantage is that the law develops from social 
and legal problems and is determined by a judge aware of the realities of 
life. The second advantage is that law developed by precedent has more 
flexibility than a statute-based system. The third advantage is that judi-
cial decisions build upon precedent and make the law more certain once 
the ratio decedendi 22 is discovered. 
In Chapter Five, "Legal Development and Confusion of Sources," 
the author points to an undercurrent of dissatisfaction with the sources 
of law, and that reform resulted in codification. Codification, however, 
did not result in clarity, completeness, or lack of ambiguity. The author 
illustrates the confusion by choosing an example from the law of delects 
(torts) from article 1384 of the French Code civil of 1804 and an example 
of problems with keeping the Chilean Codigo civil of 1857 up to date after 
codification.23 The author indicates that it should not be difficult to de-
vise a system in which the law would be less ambiguous, kept up to date, 
and still be subjected to judicial, juristic, and comparative criticism that 
could lead to further improvement. 
In Chapter Six, labeled "Two-Tier Law," the author outlines his 
plan of law-making that would be more satisfactory than those in current 
use in the Western world. This chapter is the apex of the book, because 
the author sets forth his scheme of two-tier law and challenges law re-
formers to devise a better model for improving sources of law. 
18. The advantages of statutory law are many: a statute can set out a branch of law 
clearly and systematically; drastic reforms can be made; innovations can be intro-
duced to educate the public; and defects once uncovered can be speedily remedied. 
A. WATSON, SOURCES OF LAW, LEGAL CHANGE AND AMBIGUITY 77-78 (1984). 
19. See R. WALKER & M. WALKER, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 131-37 (2d ed. 
1970). 
20. Translated as "to stand by decided cases." 
21. Note, 3 ALL E.R. 77 (1966). 
22. Translated as "the reason for the decision." 
23. Article 1384 of the Code civil reads: "One is responsible not only for the injury one 
has caused by one's own act but also for that which has been caused by the act of 
persons for whom one must be responsible or for things that one has under one's 
care." A. WATSON, SOURCES OF LAW, LEGAL CHANGE AND AMBIGUITY 98 
(1984). The author lists nine possible interpretations of article 1384 on the issue of 
liabilities for things under one's care, involving fault, strict liability, and acts of 
God, whether interpreted by the appeals court or by the commentators. Id. at 98-
99. The Chilean Codigo civil came into effect in 1857 as the most advanced, im-
pressive, and modern of all civil codes. However, by 1900, the authorities were 
stressing the need for recodification and methods to keep the law up to date after 
recodification. 
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The author's two-tiered system would establish first-rank law simi-
lar in structure to a modem code of private and commercial law com-
bined, and second-rank law consisting of commentaries on the codes that 
have the force of law. His proposal would do away with judicial deci-
sions as legal precedents and scholarly commentaries as sources of law. 
He would create a specially appointed interpretation committee of the 
legislature to make the second-rank law and to keep it (the commenta-
ries) and the first-rank law (codes and statutes) up to date. The first-rank 
law could be published every year and the second-rank law every four 
years and approved by the legislature. Any apparent gaps in first-rank 
law would be reported to the legislature and gaps in the second-rank law 
to the appropriate interpretative committees by judges rendering judicial 
opinions. In the area of public law - constitutional and administrative 
law - the author would create a public law interpretative committee 
different from the membership of the private law interpretative commit-
tee. He proposes a separate committee because of the special interest the 
legislators have in these public areas and their unwillingness to delegate 
these areas to a private law interpretative committee. 
The author outlines the appropriate forms for his first-rank law; the 
structure of the second-rank law; the relationship between the two ranks; 
the composition of the interpretative committees; several objections to 
his law-making; the possible extension of other branches of law; and how 
his system of tiered law fits into the current civil law tradition. 
The author'S proposal would reduce the need for judicial decisions 
as legal precedents, and scholarly commentaries would no longer be re-
garded as a source of law. The reason for these changes is that front-
rank law would be similar in structure and detail to a modem European 
code, that is, it would be supported by a second-rank law similar in depth 
and treatment to several of the commentaries on the French Code civil or 
the Burgerliches Gesetzhuch. Previously, court decisions in a civil law 
country had little value as precedent, while scholarly commentaries had 
great value. Under the author's proposal, the principal functions of the 
private interpretative committee would be to provide authoritative inter-
pretations of the front-rank law, review issues that have arisen in the 
courts, and suggest revisions on their own initiative as a law-proposing 
body. 
Under this proposed system, members of the private interpretative 
committee would always be subordinate to the legislature, which would 
remain the primary law-making body. The author envisions three possi-
ble ways of electing or appointing members to the private interpretative 
committee. They could be chosen from among academics, judges, and 
legal practitioners, and would be selected for their technical ability, 
drafting skills, legal inventiveness, and social awareness. Five members 
would constitute a suitable working number. 
The author recognizes that there will be objections to the system he 
has proposed and enumerates five of them: 
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Objection 1. The law-making power of the legislature will be dimin-
ished, and it is the elected representatives of the people who, in a democ-
racy, should make law. 
Objection 2. The system of first-rank and second-rank law, even 
restricted to the fields of private and commercial law, cannot be com-
plete; gaps will exist, and serious difficulties will arise in deciding actual 
cases. 
Objection 3. The system of tiered law, like the famous French 
"ecole de l'exegese," will be remote from what the courts actually do, and 
it is what courts really do that matters. 
Objection 4. The system of tiered law, like that of the Prussian code 
of 1794, the Allgemeines Landrecht fur die Preussischen Staaten, is anti-
intellectual, and will stifle judicial and academic inventiveness. 
Objection 5. The members of the interpretative committee will sit in 
an ivory tower, remote from the real world, whose problems they do not 
understand. 
The author points out that tiered law does not have to be restricted 
to private and commercial law. Criminal and civil procedure is suitable 
for tiered treatment. Also, substantive criminal law may be framed into 
a successful code, as exemplified by the numerous criminal codes of con-
tinental Europe and Latin America. 
The author's view is that his tiered law system could be readily 
adopted by the civil law system. As a precedent, he cites Justinian's 
Corpus Juris Civilis in the sixth century, A.D. The author's law of the 
first-rank is very similar to modem civil and commercial codes. Current 
civil law systems have extensive commentaries that are similar structur-
ally and conceptually to the author's second-rank law. The only major 
innovation for the civil law systems would be to embrace the interpreta-
tive committee and the law of the first and second rank as the ultimate 
source of law. 
Sophisticated lawyers and law students will find this book interest-
ing, informative, and provocative. Initiates and neophytes in the areas of 
legal history, comparative law, and jurisprudence, however, may find the 
book arid, boring, and at times difficult to comprehend. 
There is one major criticism of the book. Since the main focus of 
the book is the last chapter on the author's solution to the problem -
two-tier law - a better title would have been "Sources of Law, Legal 
Change, Ambiguity, and Solution." This reviewer thinks that too much 
emphasis was placed on the historical aspects of sources of law in ancient 
Rome and in Europe before and after the Reception in relation to the last 
chapter - the author's solution to the problem of law-making. In the 
last chapter, the author could have elucidated on how his two-tiered ap-
proach has developed in the United States, e.g., through the experience 
of the Uniform and Model Acts with their comments and the various 
American Law Institute Restatements and their comments. How effec-
tive have they been? Why do the states have difficulty in adopting them? 
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Would the two-tier system work in the states, as well as in the civil law 
countries? How would one resolve the problem between state differences 
over sovereign unacceptability of the two-tiered system? What would be 
the effect of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution24 
on state judicial decisions? Had a more extensive U.S. comparison been 
developed in regard to his proposal, a better balance would have been 
achieved in relation to the first parts of the book. 
Nonetheless, there is much food for thought in the two-tier law the-
ory and there is history to support it. The author has issued a challenge 
to law reformers to come up with a better theory. Until they do, a civil 
law country may accept some modified version of his proposal. It is a 
satisfactory improvement over the present situation, and the author 
makes a very good effort to solve a serious problem in law making. In 
the United States, the legal machinery currently exists to convert the 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws and the State of Mary-
land Commission to Revise the Annotated Code into the proposed public 
and private interpretative committees the author envisioned. His propo-
sition is stimulating and merits further exploration and embellishment by 
the law reformers. Even though the book is small in volume, it is large in 
achievement. 
24. U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 1. 
